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The Global Economic Crisis, Dual Polarization,  
and Liberal Democracy in South Korea 
Sang-Jin Han & Young-Hee Shim ∗ 
Abstract: »Globale Wirtschaftskrise, doppelte Polarisierung und liberale Demo-
kratie in Südkorea«. This paper aims at a theoretical reflection on and an em-
pirical analysis of the relationship between the global economic crisis and lib-
eral democracy in South Korea. For this, we elaborate the concept of dual 
polarization and construct a model of path analysis which includes such varia-
bles as socio-economic and political-ideological cleavage, political party affilia-
tion, ideological orientation, economic (crisis) outlook, and support for an au-
tocratic presidential rule as potential threats to liberal democracy. 
Descriptively, the paper examines how liberal democracy has unfolded and 
where South Korea stands today with regard to the quality of her democracy. 
Analytically, the paper examines where the potential threat to liberal democra-
cy comes from based on a general population survey in Korea from 2014. The 
major findings of our analysis include: 1) The support for autocratic presiden-
tial power is stronger among citizens than among MPs. 2) Political party affilia-
tion, ideological orientation, and economic (crisis) outlook are closely interre-
lated and significantly affected by the political-ideological cleavage. All 
independent variables contribute to explaining support for an autocratic presi-
dential rule. 3) Yet there also exists strong support for a democratic regime 
among both MPs and citizens. 
Keywords: Economic crisis, liberal democracy, socio-economic polarization, po-
litical-ideological polarization, autocracy, South Korea. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
South Korea represents a case of a new democracy1 that exhibits not only ad-
vanced liberal democratic institutions but also a successful trajectory of trans-
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ferring political power peacefully from the ruling to the opposition parties since 
1997. Together with an undisputable record of economic modernization since 
the 1960s, this political achievement has attracted global attention. Yet Korea 
today is even more interesting in that she appears capable of dealing with the 
challenges of the global economic crisis while sustaining liberal democracy 
even though there are certain tendencies and problems that require careful 
investigation. This paper aims at such an investigation.  
Needless to say, the Korean way of modernization and political develop-
ment frequently underwent ups and downs in a relatively short period of time, 
suffering from dictatorial regimes,2 but also showing a brave struggle for liber-
al democracy by students and citizens. Some of the major instances of the 
democratic movement for epochal changes include the April Student Revolu-
tion of 1960, the May Gwangju Democratic Uprising of 1980, the June Demo-
cratic Movement of 1987, the candlelight march against beef reimports from 
the U.S. in 2008, and the candlelight vigil for the impeachment of former Pres-
ident Park Geun-Hye in 2016. 
This paper traces the overall trend of South Korean democracy since the 
1980s, asking the following research questions: 1) How has liberal democracy 
progressed? 2) How has socio-economic and political-ideological polarization 
unfolded within the context of the global economic crisis? 3) Where does South 
Korea stand today in terms of the quality of its democracy? 4) Is there any 
potential threat to liberal democracy, and, if so, where does it come from? 
This paper is both descriptive and analytic. It is descriptive insofar as we 
examine two aspects of Korean democratic development: the longitudinal trend 
of liberal democracy (Han 2009, 2002, 2001a, 2001b) on the one hand and 
socio-economic and political-ideological polarization on the other (Han 2007). 
We will move on to examine the quality of democracy with respect to civil 
rights and socio-economic rights, paying attention to the normative and the 
substantive dimensions of democracy, that is, democracy as value commitment 
and the political performance of the incumbent government. We will then raise 
our key analytic question, namely the level of support for an autocratic presi-
dential rule, which we assume to constitute a potential threat to liberal democ-
racy. While the first two parts are more or less descriptive, the third part is 
explicitly analytical. For this, a path analysis will be performed to determine 
the impact of independent variables such as the political-ideological and the 
socio-economic cleavage, political party affiliation, and ideological orientation 
                                                                                                                                
1  With the defeat of Japan in WWII, Korea was liberated in 1945, but was divided in two 
zones along 38th parallel. This resulted in the first democratic elections in South Korea in 
May 1948 which took place under UN supervision 
2  After the end of the Korean War in 1953, South Korea had an authoritarian regime and 
experienced two military coups in 1961 and 1979, which both times resulted in a return to 
power of authoritarian presidents. The dictatorial regimes were governed by Rhee Syng-man 
(1948-1960), Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), and Chun Du-whan (1980-1987).  
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– as well as the economic (crisis) outlook as mediating variable – on the de-
pendent variable, the level of support for an autocratic presidential rule. The 
conclusion is that threat and hope are in balance when we evaluate where Ko-
rean democracy stands today. 
The key analytic question is whether or not, and, if so, how and to what ex-
tent the two economic crises Korea experienced during the last decades have 
posed a potential threat to liberal democracy. The first crisis was the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s, the second the global economic crisis that 
started in 2008. Overall, however, liberal democratic institutions have pro-
gressed well in Korea since 1987 and particularly since 1998, when the first 
peaceful transfer of governmental power occurred in Korea through the direct 
presidential election in December 1997 (Han 2018b and 2014; Choi 2012). An 
important point is that socio-economic polarization began to increase during 
this period because that change in government coincided with the first econom-
ic crisis. The government of Kim Dae-jung was able to overcome the economic 
crisis. However, ideological polarization began to manifest itself during his 
tenure in office, affected by his so-called “Sunshine Policy”. The conservative 
party (Grand National Party at that time, later Saenuri Party, currently Liberty 
Korea Party) that had lost power in the presidential elections of 1997 and 2002 
began to attack the new government as being too soft on the North Korean 
regime, thereby sparking off ideological conflicts. When the conservative party 
regained power after the presidential election of 2007, socio-economic and 
political-ideological polarization began to penetrate each other deeply. Conse-
quently, party politics became far more divisive than in the past. This political 
and ideological cleavage has affected public perceptions of the quality of de-
mocracy as well as the management of the economic crisis. For this reason, this 
paper includes a detailed description of what has happened in Korea before 
turning to the question of the potential threat to liberal democracy. 
With this goal in mind, we will first present an account of the overall trend 
of political democratization in Korea from 1981 to 2008. V-Dem’s Liberal 
Democracy Index confirms the remarkable advancement of liberal democracy 
after 1987, as well as a slight decline since 2008. Against this background, we 
will examine the two modes of polarization and show some evidence concern-
ing the negative impacts of these polarizations on economic life and democratic 
politics. The data we use here are mostly MP surveys from 2007 and 2013 
(Klingemann and Hoffmann-Lange 2018, in this issue) and the Korean general 
population survey of 2014.3 Although this paper is only a case study of Korea, 
there are good reasons to assume a similar tendency in other new democracies 
like Poland, Chile, Turkey, and South Africa (see the contributions of Hoff-
                                                             
3  The general population survey in Korea was conducted in January 2014 and included 1,059 
respondents. It was funded by the Joongmin Foundation for Social Theory and the field 
work was carried out by Hankook Research. 
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We operationalized the socio-economic cleavage a dummy variable with 
two categories by asking respondents whether they see themselves as belonging 
to the middle class or to the lower class.5 For the operationalization of the 
political-ideological cleavage we assumed that a bureaucratic-authoritarian 
state has dominated all aspects of modernization in the East Asian countries 
(Han 2018a). Consequently, a state-centered mentality is deeply rooted in 
South Korea. Against this state-centered legacy, the process of democratic 
transformation has unfolded since the 1980s and given rise to an alternative 
position which we call a “citizens-first” position (Han 2017b, 205). In South 
Korea, a bottom-up participatory paradigm of citizens has emerged through the 
social process of communication, sharply distinguished from a traditional top-
down authoritarian paradigm of the state. Thus, we asked the respondents 
which side they would take in a conflict over between a government decision 
and the citizens’ preferences concerning an important public issue.6 This con-
ceptual strategy means that we identify the political-ideological cleavage em-
pirically as one between state power and citizen empowerment. The former 
suggests that one sees reality from the perspective of government authority, 
whereas in the latter one sees reality from the perspective of the citizens.  
As to the secondary determinant, party affiliation is either the party mem-
bership of the MPs or the party vote of the citizens. Ideological orientation was 
measured by self-placement on a 10-point left-right scale with a range from 1 
on the left to 10 on the right. 
Concerning the mediating variable, we started from the assumption that it is 
not the objective depth of the economic crisis itself, but rather its perception, 
particularly the economic (crisis) outlook that shapes individuals’ preferences 
regarding the government’s policies to cope with the crisis. We thus distin-
guished three types of economic outlook: positive, negative, and constant,7 and 
investigated their relationship with independent and dependent variables.  
                                                                                                                                
Ideology: Range 1 (conservative) – 10 (progressive) 
Political-Ideological Cleavage: Trust Government=0 Trust Citizens=1 
Economic Crisis Outlook: Negative=0 Constant=1 Positive=2 
Support for Autocratic Presidential Rule: Range 1 (Strongly Oppose) – 4 (Strongly Support) 
5  The small minority of respondents with an upper-class identity has been merged with the 
middle class. 
6  The question for measuring the political-ideological cleavage was the following: “When a 
decision by the government and preference by citizens as reflected in public opinion are in 
conflict concerning an important public policy that affects your life, which side would you 
take? One argues that we should follow the government because it represents public au-
thority and the other argues that we should follow citizens because the policy affects your 
life.” The general population survey of 2014 included this question, but not the MPs survey.  
7  We measured these outlooks by combining the responses to the following two questions: 
“Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in your 
country is: 1) a lot better, 2) a little better, 3) stayed the same, 4) a little worse and 5) a lot 
worse?” And “Over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in 
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Finally, concerning the dependent variable, we assume support for an auto-
cratic presidential rule to constitute a potential threat to liberal democracy. The 
analytic focus of this variable is clear because, like military rule, it may con-
tribute to destroying the institutional framework of liberal democracy, whereas 
populist politics, often referred to as a threat to democracy, too, is compatible 
with electoral democracy. 
2. Transition to Democracy and Longitudinal Political 
Trends in Korea 
As measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) compiled annually by 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Korea has experienced 
significant progress with respect to several indicators included in the HDI.8 The 
average life expectancy at birth increased from 71.7 years in 1990 to 81.9 in 
2014. The number of average years of schooling increased from 8.9 years in 
1990 to 11.9 in 2014. Gross national income (GNI) per capita increased from 
US $12,064 in 1990 to US $33,890 in 2014. The overall HDI score rose from 
0.73 in 1990 to 0.90 in 2014. These trends point to a successful economic mod-
ernization of Korean society.  
However, the relations of politics, economy, and civil society have involved 
ambiguities and uncertainties, particularly after the period of democratic transi-
tion was completed and regular democratic elections were introduced (Han 
2009, 2014; Choi 2012; Im 2014; Shin 2012). This decline may be explained 
by the so-called Asian economic crisis that resulted in massive layoffs of work-
ers and large-scale shutdowns of companies. This was a severe blow to Kore-
ans accustomed to continued economic growth for several decades. Civil socie-
ty, once seen as providing the energy for change, became now exceedingly 
conflictual and divisive due to the economic, ideological, regional, and genera-
tional cleavages in Korean society. Furthermore, the global economic recession 
from 2008 onwards has produced additional strains, conflicts and risks, includ-
ing a rising gap between the rich and the poor. This trend may be detrimental to 
the political and social integration of the country and is apt to damage the pub-
lic’s evaluation of democracy. Disillusioned by the so-called “hostile coexist-
                                                                                                                                
this country will be? 1) a lot better, 2) a little better, 3) has stayed the same, 4) a little 
worse, 5) a lot worse.” The first question refers to a comparison of the current situation with 
the past, and the second refers to the expectation for the future economic situation com-
pared with the present. Out of the nine resulting trends, we classified three upward trends 
as positive (optimistic) outlooks and three downward trends as negative (pessimistic) out-
looks and one trend with no change as constant. A small number of irregular patterns were 
excluded from the analysis. 
8   Source: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data-explorer>, last accessed: Jan. 12, 2017. 
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about 0.14 in 1980, but rose rapidly to 0.52 in 1988. It rose further to 0.76 in 
1998 with the first change in government after the election of Kim Dae-Jung. 
Figure 2 clearly shows that the Asian economic crisis did not affect the index 
of liberal democracy. It remained at a high level until 2007. However, in 2008, 
when the conservative government of Lee Myung-bak came to power, the 
index dropped to 0.71 from 0.78 (the first drop) and further to 0.64 in 2013 
when Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of former dictatorial ruler Park Chung-Hee, 
took office (the second drop). This decline may have been due to the change in 
government and the authoritarian policy orientations of the new government. 
Yet it may also have been affected by the economic decline triggered by the 
second economic crisis. 
When we compare the liberal democracy index for Korea with that of other 
countries in the region, the rapid transition of Korea stands out. For example, 
the liberal democracy index for Japan has been about 0.8 and very stable for 35 
years. China’s values are about 0.06 and equally stable. Compared with these 
two countries, Korea shows a rapid transition to democracy with some fluctua-
tions until 1997, when the index stabilized at a high level after the first demo-
cratic change in government. 
We can further break down the index into its eight constituent dimensions of 
“liberal democracy” to observe this trend in more detail. The eight dimensions 
are 1) freedom of association, 2) expanded freedom of expression, 3) clean 
election index, 4) access to alternative information sources, 5) percent of popu-
lation with suffrage, 6) equality before the law, 7) judicial and 8) legislative 
constraints on the executive.10  
Figure 3 shows the values for the eight dimensions in 2007 and 2014. The 
year 2007 was the last year of government by the Democratic (progressive) 
Party. The figure shows almost no difference between these two points in time 
with respect to legislative constraints on the executive, equality before the law, 
and share of population with suffrage. However, the quality of democracy 
decreased significantly, especially in the dimensions of freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, alternative sources of information and judicial con-
straints on the executive. This tendency was also reflected in public opinion, as 
our general population surveys of 2007 and 2014 show. Public perceptions of a 
decline in basic civil and political rights led to doubts and frustrations about the 
role of the government, especially with regard to the quality of democracy. 
                                                             
10  Detailed information on the operationalization of these eight dimensions can be found in 
the V-Dem Codebook 2017: <https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/84/a8/84a880ae-
e0ca-4ad3-aff8-556abfdaff70/v-dem_codebook_v71.pdf> (last accessed on March 26, 
2018) 
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Figure 3: Dimensions of Liberal Democracy in South Korea, 2007, and 2014  
 
Source: V-dem datasets <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2/>, last accessed: 
Jan. 12, 2017 
Note: The corners signify the eight dimensions mentioned above. The scale for the cobweb 
lines is indicated in the middle. 
3. Dual Polarization 
3.1 The Increase in Socio-Economic Polarization 
In Korea, socio-economic disparities started to increase visibly in 1998, when 
the Asian economic crisis hit the country (Kim 2017; Seong 2017). Numerous 
businesses collapsed and a large number of workers lost their jobs. This was a 
severe blow to most Koreans accustomed to steady economic growth, dreaming 
of a middle class country. Comparatively, the Korean situation may still not 
look as desperate as other countries such as ones in Southern Europe (Greece, 
Italy, and Spain). Yet one should bear in mind the high level of public percep-
tion (construction) of socio-economic polarization in South Korea evolving 
along with her national memories and developmental trajectories.  
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Table 1: Socio-Economic Indicators of Korea: 1990-2015 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
GDP per Capita (US $)A 6516.31 12332.98 11947.58 18639.52 22086.95 27105.08 
GDP Growth Rate (%)B 3 3.05 4.4 3.85 6.5 2.73
HDIC 0.749 0.8 0.839 0.875 0.905 0.901 
Unemployment Rate 
(%)D 2.4 2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.6 
Irregular Employment 
Rate (%)E 45.76 41.86 52.13 36.6 33.3 32.5 
Youth Unemployment 
Rate (%)F 5.5 4.6 8.1 8 7.9 9.1 
Single Household Rate 
(%)G 9 12.7 15.5 20 23.9 27.2 
Gini CoefficientH 0.256 0.251 0.266 0.317 0.32 0.295 
Suicide Rate per 
100,000 PersonsI 8.8 12.7 16.6 29.9 33.5 N/A 
Poverty Rate of Elderly 
(Under Poverty Line)J N/A N/A N/A 32 48.2 51.2 
Poverty Rate of Elderly 
(Under 50% of Median 
Income)K 
N/A N/A N/A 45 59.1 62.1 
Source:  
A: GDP per capita – World Bank  
B: GDP growth rate – World Bank  
C: HDI – UNDP Human Development Report  
D: Unemployment Rate – Korean Statistical Information Service Database  
E: Irregular Employment Rate – Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey 
(1990-2000) & Korean Statistical Information Service Database (2005-2015)  
F: Youth Unemployment Rate – Korean Statistical Information Service Database  
G: Single Household Rate – Korea Population and Housing Census Database  
H: Gini Coefficient – Household Survey data of Statistics Korea  
I: Suicide Rate per 100,000 Persons – OECD  
K: Poverty Rate of Elderly – Korea Poverty Statistics Yearbook 2005-2016 by Korea Institute 
for Health and Social Affairs 
 
Table 1 shows that Korea’s GDP was markedly lower in 2000 than in 1995.11 
At the same time, the unemployment rate, the rate of temporary employment 
and youth unemployment, the share of single households and the suicide rate 
rose considerably while Korea went through structural adjustments dictated by 
the IMF. As a consequence, not only blue-collar workers but also many mem-
bers of the middle class (professionals, managerial staff, technical supervisors, 
and white-collar employees) lost their jobs. The number of people with irregu-
lar employment contracts increased sharply too, and their standard of living 
                                                             
11  The Korean GDP growth rate in 2007 was more than 5 percent. It dropped rapidly to 2.8% 
in 2008, reaching its lowest score of 0.7% in 2009. It briefly recovered to 6.5% in 2010, but 
since 2012 onwards it remains about 3%. This still may look not as desperate as in other 
countries like Greece. But it shows that the global economic crisis from 2008 onwards has 
had a substantial impact on the Korean economy. 
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deteriorated. A decline in income frequently goes hand in hand with exclusion 
from various forms of social insurance (pensions, workplace accident protec-
tion, unemployment insurance), all of which contributed to an increase in the 
number of working poor.  
One of the most serious problems of the increasing socio-economic dispari-
ties is the increase in youth unemployment. As Table 1 shows, the rate was 
5.5% in 1990, and then increased to 8.1% in 2000 and to 9.1% in 2015. Con-
versely, the employment ratio in the age group of 20 to 24 decreased continu-
ously from 51.6% in 2005 to 44.3% in 2010 and 43.2% in 2013 (Han 2017a). 
Another serious problem is poverty among older people. The number of older 
people below the poverty line increased from 32% in 2005 to 48.2% in 2005 
and 51.2% in 2015. The number of those below 50 % of the median income 
increased from 45% to 59.1% and 62.1% during the same period. Likewise, the 
suicide rate per 100,000 persons has increased continuously.  
Another serious problem is the increasing disparity between employees with 
standard employment contracts and those with other kinds and often precarious 
employment (Shin 2013; Han 2017a). As of 2015, the latter made up 32.5% of 
the total employment. Precise estimates regarding the size of this group are 
lacking due to the variety of such different forms of employment as either 
temporary or part-time job or other non-standard forms such as contract work. 
Given the technical difficulties in determining the exact size of this sector, 
Table 1 shows that the size of temporary employment broadly defined reached 
its highest share with about 52% in 2000 when the government employed large 
numbers of part-time workers for public works in response to the first econom-
ic crisis. No matter how we estimate its size, there is no doubt that the share of 
these irregular forms of employment is high today and has significantly in-
creased in the wake of the two economic crises. Therefore, it is important to 
draw attention to the problems of the working poor. As of 2015, the monthly 
wage of employees with irregular employment contracts was only 55.8% of 
that of regular employees. Their hourly wage was 64.3%. 
Summing up, the Korean experience of increasing socio-economic dispari-
ties since 1997 is revealing. Shocked by two economic crises and driven by 
economic globalization and global competition, the large corporations have 
become preoccupied with short-term profit maximization at the expense of 
small subcontractors. The disparity between the highest income bracket and 
lowest income bracket, together with the widening gap between large-scale 
conglomerates and small to medium enterprises and the growing cleavages in 
employment patterns between regular and irregular workers, have given rise to 
a strong social perception of socio-economic polarization. 
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3.2 Trends towards Political-Ideological Polarization 
Now, we come to political-ideological polarization in Korea (Choi 1994). To 
reiterate our discussion, socio-economic polarization has brought about in-
creasing inequalities and disparities. However, deepening inequalities are not 
simply the result of economic globalization and neoliberal policies. They also 
presuppose an underlying network among power-holders in government, busi-
ness, labor, media, and other interest groups, allowing them to pursue their 
interests (Mills 1959). This implies a systematic linkage between the socio-
economic and the political-ideological cleavage. The empirical outcome of the 
first cleavage usually refers to socio-economic status whose explanatory power 
for the standard of living is evident. However, what we call secondary determi-
nants, that is, political party affiliation and ideological orientation, are more 
closely related to the political-ideological cleavage than to the socio-economic 
one, as we will see soon. The political-ideological cleavage largely shapes the 
citizens’ perception of political reality.  
In South Korea, political-ideological polarization has entailed a proliferation 
of intense conflicts and head-on confrontation between the two major political 
parties which mobilize their members and supporters by means of ideological 
and emotional appeals.12 The resulting politics of emotion may uncover an 
underlying struggle for hegemony (Lukes 1974; Gavanta 1980). In this regard, 
the major characteristics of the Korean experience of polarization are as fol-
lows:  
1) As in other countries, Korea also shows a high degree of socio-economic 
inequality that has been exacerbated by the global economic crisis.  
2) This cleavage is not limited to socio-economic issues, but also involves 
different life styles, value orientations and mentalities.  
3) The socio-economic and the political-ideological polarizations are close-
ly interrelated, thereby intensifying the conflict between the two political 
camps. 
4) This implies a high degree of emotional confrontation between the two 
parties and their supporters to the extent that they refuse to engage in se-
rious negotiations and are not willing to accept any compromises.13 
                                                             
12  The typical strategy taken by power elites is inviting and reinforcing confrontational (hard-
line) responses from the counterpart. In this way, they reciprocally control the political 
agenda by continuing a confrontational politics. Polarization expands to society when the 
politically organized supporters of the political parties confront each other with manufac-
tured voices and emotions.  
13  This clarification helps to understand the context in which the formation of the two camps 
of state power and citizens took place. It also helps to understand why the perception of 
political reality is primarily shaped by political-ideological differences rather than by socio-
economic status. The two major political parties have been able to monopolize the political 
game, yet they are insulated from the everyday concerns of the citizens such as increasing 
poverty, inequality and socio-economic polarization. 
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The impact of political-ideological polarization on the evaluation of the gov-
ernment’s performance in managing the economic crisis was measured by the 
following question: “How do you evaluate the performance of different nation-
al and international actors in handling the impact of the crisis?” “1” meant that 
the performance of the actor was very poor and “10” meant that it was very 
competent. Tables 2 and 3 show that the evaluation by MPs and citizens of the 
authorities in charge of managing the recession in Korea, such as the Blue 
House, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, the party in government 
and the opposition party, strongly depends on one’s party affiliation, ideologi-
cal preference, and economic (crisis) outlook.14 These evaluations are more 
strongly influenced by the political-ideological rather than the socio-economic 
cleavage. Respondents with a conservative ideological orientation, affiliated 
with the conservative Saenuri party that was in power at the time (2014) and 
with an optimistic economic outlook rated government performance more 
positively than supporters of the opposition party with a progressive orientation 
and a pessimistic view of the economic development. The exact relationships 
among these variables are provided in Figure 8. 
Table 2: Evaluation of Korean Authorities in Charge of Economic Policy– MPs 
2013  
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The Blue 
House 56.1 33.5 29.0 17.861*** 59.8 26.2 97.672*** 59.5 22.2 148.397*** 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Affairs 
56.8 35.6 28.7 21.112*** 56.8 28.4 67.784*** 56.8 24.8 103.973*** 
Party in 
Government 56.4 33.5 30.7 19.033*** 58.1 28.6 76.718*** 58.3 24.8 122.295*** 
Opposition 
Party 42.5 44.2 40.6 0.289 39.8 43.3 1.024 39.9 43.6 1.128 
Source: CMP Survey 2013. Average scores on a 100-point scale 
                                                             
14  The Blue House in Korea is the seat of the presidential office. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Finance is in charge of economic planning, public finance, and the implementa-
tion of economic policies. The Korean congress is a unicameral legislature composed of 
about 300 MPs. The Korean party system is characterized by a high degree of competitive-
ness with close results in parliamentary elections. 
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Table 3: Evaluation of Korean Authorities in Charge of Economic Policy – 
Citizens 2014  
Political 
Institution 
Economic Outlook Ideology Political Party
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The Blue 
House 54.5 41.1 26.1 172.06*** 51.1 23.8 447.20*** 48.9 27.4 272.95*** 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Affairs 
52.8 40.9 26 171.06*** 48.2 25.6 299.54*** 46.9 28 224.35*** 
Party in 
Government 31.2 29.6 17.1 59.633*** 28.6 18.9 53.872*** 28.1 20.3 39.212*** 
Opposition 
Party 43.4 33.1 19.1 124.59*** 41.1 16.9 328.72*** 39.2 20.2 214.46*** 
4. Dual Polarization and Challenge to Democracy 
4.1 Quality of Democracy Assessed Empirically  
The key analytic question of this paper asks if the global economic crisis has 
affected liberal democracy in Korea. Before we tackle this issue, we want to 
examine to what extent the crisis has influenced the citizens’ expectations from 
democracy. As the economy develops and the standard of living improves, it 
can be expected that citizens react more strongly when their standard of living 
is endangered. Likewise, as democracy moves on, citizens expect more from 
democracy than the mere observance of democratic procedures, as seen in 
studies of value change (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
This is why we pay attention to the concept of the quality of democracy, in-
cluding civil-political and socio-economic rights. According to O’Donnell,  
an assessment of the quality of democracy should not be indifferent to the ex-
tent to which some basic aspects of human development and human rights 
have been achieved, nor to the number and social characteristics of those who 
are deprived. Simply put, severe deprivation in these matters means that ex-
cept for exceptional individuals, their political agency is disabled. Insofar as 
democracy entails political citizenship, including its participatory rights, it in-
cludes the expectation that everyone is at least above a floor of basic human 
capabilities and human rights that enables them, if they wish, to exercise their 
political citizenship. (O’Donnell 2004, 62-3) 
The key point of O’Donnell is that civil-political rights and socio-economic 
rights, as two basic components of the quality of democracy, are so interrelated 
in democratic society that the first serves as the basis of the latter. There is a 
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broad consensus about the importance of fundamental civil (liberal) rights for 
democracy. However, the socioeconomic aspects of the quality of democracy 
are equally important.  
This is due to my belief that in order for these [socioeconomic] needs to be 
met, the enjoyment of political rights and important advances in civil rights 
are very important. Otherwise, the policies against poverty and inequality will 
continue being captured and distorted by ingrained practices of clientelism 
and paternalism. Democracy and its rights are important – probably they are 
necessary conditions – for advances in human development that are not easily 
reversible and/or submerge the popular sector in further clientelistic depend-
ency. (O’Donnell 2004, 32). 
A pertinent empirical question is, then, how these two dimensions of the quali-
ty of democracy work in Korea (Han 2010). Therefore, the surveys of MPs and 
citizens included a list of 13 characteristics of democracy. Respondents were 
first asked to rate the degree to which they considered these as essential charac-
teristics of a democracy. In a second step, they were asked to rate to what ex-
tent they were actually realized in the country. The importance ratings measure 
citizen demands, while the second question measures the perceived democratic 
performance of the incumbent government, among them civil liberties and 
political participation rights, free and equal elections and the freedom to criti-
cize the government. Economic rights include supplementary benefits to people 
below the poverty line, economic growth, unemployment compensation, 
measures to ensure a basic standard of living for the poor and government 
responsibility for full employment. Social rights, finally, are distinguished as a 
third group of rights that involve both of these dimensions. The respect for 
human dignity, women’s rights, equal educational opportunities, and minority 
rights are basic human rights, but at the same time they are supposed to prevent 
economic discrimination against the members of economically disadvantaged 
groups.  
Figure 4 shows the differences in the perception of democracy by MPs and 
citizens with respect to citizen demands and democratic performance in Korea 
based on the 2014 survey data. It shows the following characteristics. First, 
MPs and citizens converge on the view that the political-civil rights listed, 
including both civil and social rights, are more essential for democracy than 
socio-economic rights. Second, civil and social rights show a larger gap be-
tween democratic demands and perceived democratic performance among both 
MPs and citizens. This implies greater conflicts over the quality of democracy 
with respect to these rights. Third, MPs show a stronger normative commit-
ment to democracy than citizens. Fourth, the perceived democratic perfor-
mance is particularly low with regard to the freedom to criticize the govern-
ment, supplementary benefits for people below the poverty line, government 
responsibility for full employment, and minority rights. Fifth, citizens are more 
critical of the incumbent government’s democratic performance than MPs. This 
indicates that citizens place less emphasis on liberal democratic rights, but at 
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Above all, it should be noted that the independent variables party affiliation 
and ideological orientation are closely related. In the MP survey of 2013, 
87.7% of the members of the party in government identified as conservative, 
whereas 95.7% of the members of the opposition party identified as progres-
sive. Among the citizens interviewed in 2014, 83.0% of the supporters of the 
party in government identified as conservative, whereas 79.9% of the support-
ers of the opposition party identified as progressive. Usually, party affiliation 
shapes immediate political attitudes, whereas ideology provides a long-term 
outlook. Moreover, Table 5 shows a close relationship between economic out-
look and party affiliation as well as ideological orientation. An optimistic eco-
nomic outlook predominates among respondents affiliated with the party in 
government and respondents with a conservative ideological orientation. This 
tendency is stronger among MPs than among citizens. In contrast, a pessimistic 
outlook is more frequent among members and supporters of the opposition 
party and among those with a progressive ideological orientation. This tenden-
cy is again much stronger among MPs than among citizens.  
Table 5: Economic Outlook of MPs and Citizens (%) 
Positive Constant Negative
MPs 
Party 
Governing Party 67.3 10.2 22.4
Opposition Party 12.8 27.7 59.6
Ideology Conservative 71.1 13.3 15.6
Progressive 14.3 22.4 63.3
Total 40.5 19.2 40.3
Citizens 
Party 
Governing Party 41.1 21.8 37.0
Opposition Party 13.7 20.7 65.6
Ideology 
Conservative 39.1 22.3 38.6
Progressive 15.7 22.3 62.0
Total 26.5 22.3 51.2
Source: CMP Survey 2013. Source: General Population Survey 2014. 
 
This finding has drawn our attention to the statistical influence of political 
party affiliation and ideological orientation on other variables included in Fig-
ure 8. Despite the close relationship between party affiliation and ideology that 
was mentioned before, political party affiliation has an additional effect on the 
perceptions of the economic situation. Regardless of their position on the polit-
ical-ideological cleavage, respondents affiliated with the governmental party 
show more trust in the government’s capability of coping with the economic 
crisis and share an optimistic economic outlook. We can confirm this in Figure 
8 that shows complex statistical relationships among the variables involved.18 
                                                             
18  Figure 8 shows that the socio-economic cleavage affects the ideological orientation which 
implies that the middle class is more conservative, even though the coefficient is barely sig-
nificant. The ideological orientation, in turn, affects the economic crisis outlook, which 
means that a conservative orientation fosters a positive economic outlook. It also affects 
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In contrast, the influence of the political-ideological cleavage is pervasive, 
influencing all statistical relations. Of particular significance in this regard is 
that the strong independent influence of the political-ideological cleavage on 
support for an autocratic presidential rule in Figure 7 disappears in Figure 8, 
replaced by the strong statistical relationship between the political-ideological 
cleavage and party affiliation. Party affiliation, in turn, strongly affects the 
economic (crisis) outlook and support for an autocratic presidential rule.19 This 
means that those who support the conservative ruling party (as of 2014) show a 
more positive economic outlook, which increases support for an autocratic 
presidential rule. Both party affiliation and ideological orientation wield a 
significant influence on the mediating variable and the dependent variable. It is 
also clear that the mediating variable exercises an independent influence on the 
dependent variable. 
The path analysis thus yields a clear-cut picture. Particularly noticeable is 
the strong statistical relationship between the political-ideological cleavage on 
one side and party affiliation, ideological orientation and the economic (crisis) 
outlook on the other side. The same is true for the relationship between the 
economic outlook and support for an autocratic presidential rule and for that 
between party affiliation and an autocratic presidential rule. 
                                                                                                                                
the dependent variable, which means that a conservative ideological leaning increases sup-
port for an autocratic presidential rule. Figure 8 shows clearly that the influence of the so-
cio-economic cleavage is only indirect.  
19  In the data of the sixth wave of the World Value Survey 2010, however, no significant 
relationship between party affiliation and support for an autocratic presidential rule can be 
found. This difference is primarily due to the difference in the timing of the two surveys. 
While the WVS was conducted in 2010 and asked for the party vote in the 2007 presidential 
election in which Lee Myung-bak of the liberal party won by a landslide, the general popu-
lation survey of 2014 which we use for analysis in this paper was conducted after the 2012 
presidential election in which Park Geun-hye of the conservative party was elected by a 
narrow margin. In other words, in the 2010 WVS the majority of the respondents supported 
the liberal party. Therefore, it is not surprising to find no significant relationship between a 
vote for the party in government and support for autocracy. However, the situation was 
different in the general population survey of 2014 which shows a significant relationship 
between these two variables.  
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was the summit meeting of Donald Trump of the United States and Kim Jong-
un of North Korea in Singapore on June 12, 2018, dismantling the persistent 
cold war legacy on the Korean Peninsula. 
Despite these changes, however, the socio-economic and political-
ideological polarization examined in this paper is still pronounced and the 
consequences of economic crisis are still pervasive. Likewise, the antagonism 
and hostility between the ruling and the opposition party as well as between the 
political forces backing these parties have not subsided. Geopolitical instability 
on the Korean Peninsula is still very high as well.  
Yet the potential threat to liberal democracy is likely to decrease due to the 
change in government. We have argued that the potential threat to liberal de-
mocracy primarily emanated from citizens who supported the conservative 
party in power until 2017, because they perceived that their standard of living 
was threatened. They expected that an autocratic president would protect their 
economic interests. As of 2018, however, those who support the present liberal 
government are more inclined to promote participatory democracy rather than 
asking for an autocratic presidential rule. 
Furthermore, we should not underestimate the strong support for democracy 
in Korea both among MPs and citizens.20 One type of support is the broad 
acceptance of the advantages of living in a democratic country. Another type of 
support is the widely shared perception that the democratic political system is 
functioning fairly well. Support for democracy in these respects is strong, even 
though it shows some fluctuations over time. In addition, we should bear in 
mind the existence of a broad consensus among MPs and citizens on the nor-
mative value of the civil and social rights that are constitutive characteristics of 
a liberal democracy (Figure 4). The degree of congruence among citizens and 
MPs is significantly higher with respect to free elections, civil rights, freedom 
of criticism of the government, individual dignity and human rights, equality in 
education, and minority rights than for socio-economic rights. Even though the 
perceived degree of their realization by incumbent governments lags behind the 
normative support they receive, we can confirm the existence of a strong buffer 
against democratic backsliding. 
                                                             
20  The questions for measuring support of democracy as value orientation and as regime 
support in MP surveys (2007 and 2013) were as follows:  
“Although democracy has many shortcomings, it is still better than any other political sys-
tem.” 
“How democratically is this country being governed today?”  
In the general population survey of 2014, the wording of the first question was slightly dif-
ferent: “How important do you think is it to live in a country run democratically?”.  
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